Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual Fund Managers by Ma, Linlin
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Finance Dissertations Department of Finance
Summer 8-3-2013
Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual
Fund Managers
Linlin Ma
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/finance_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Finance at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Finance Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ma, Linlin, "Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual Fund Managers." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2013.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/finance_diss/23
  
PERMISSION TO BORROW 
 
 
 
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced 
degree from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall 
make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations 
governing materials of this type.  I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or 
publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his/her absence, the professor 
under whose direction it was written or, in his absence, by the Dean of the Robinson 
College of Business.  Such quoting, copying, or publishing must be solely for the 
scholarly purposes and does not involve potential financial gain.  It is understood that any 
copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential gain will not be 
allowed without written permission of the author. 
 
LINLIN MA 
  
  
NOTICE TO BORROWERS 
 
 
 
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in 
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
LINLIN MA 
1101 COLLIER RD NW, APT# Q2 
ATLANTA, GA 30318 
 
The director of this dissertation is: 
DR. VIKAS AGARWAL  
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
J. MACK ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
35 BROAD STREET, NW, SUITE 1207 
ATLANTA, GA 30303 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual Fund Managers 
 
BY 
 
LINLIN MA 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2013 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
LINLIN MA 
2013 
  
      
 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of LINLIN MA’s Dissertation 
Committee.  It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it 
has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of 
Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of 
Georgia State University. 
 
 H. Fenwick Huss, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
VIKAS AGARWAL (Chair) 
LIXIN HUANG 
JAYANT KALE 
VIKRAM NANDA (External- Georgia Institute of Technology) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would like to sincerely thank my advisor Vikas Agarwal for his continuous support 
during my Ph.D. study. I am thankful to my other committee members Lixin Huang, 
Jayant Kale, and Vikram Nanda for their valuable advice. I thank my fellow doctoral 
students for their friendship. Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to 
my husband Bo Xu for his love, support, encouragement, and patience. Many thanks to 
my parents and in-laws for their faith in me. I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved 
daughter Megan Xu.  
I acknowledge the helpful comments made by Mark Chen, Gang Dong, Gerry Gay, 
Omesh Kini, Robert McDonald, Alfred Mettler, Todd Stonitsch, Manju Puri, Chip Ryan, 
Zhen Shi, Yuehua Tang, Baozhong Yang, Jie Yang and seminar participants at the 2011 
FMA Ph.D. Consortium, Georgia State University, University of San Diego, Clemson 
University, UMass Amherst, Virginia Commonwealth University, Quinnipiac University, 
SUNY Albany, and Northeastern University. All remaining errors are mine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual Fund Managers 
 
BY 
LINLIN MA 
June 12, 2013 
 
 
Committee Chair: VIKAS AGARWAL 
Major Academic Unit: DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
 
I use a unique dataset of 1,808 mutual fund manager replacements to study the 
determinants and the subsequent impact of the choice between hiring the successor from 
within (internal hire) and outside (external hire) the fund family. I find that fund families 
prefer to replace their top performers with internal hires and bottom performers with 
external hires. External hires demonstrate superior ability to turn around bottom 
performing funds, but exhibit inferior ability to maintain the record of top performing 
funds. I find no cross-sectional difference in post-replacement performance between 
internal and external successors, indicating fund families, in general, make their 
replacement decisions optimally. I do, however, find that funds that deviate from the 
optimal decision have subsequent sub-par performance. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that portfolio managers play a pivotal role in determining mutual fund performance.  
 
 
 
 
Internal versus External Replacement of Mutual Fund Managers 
 
Linlin Ma
*
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
I use a unique dataset of 1,808 mutual fund manager replacements to study the 
determinants and the subsequent impact of the choice between hiring the successor from 
within (internal hire) and outside (external hire) the fund family. I find that fund families 
prefer to replace their top performers with internal hires and bottom performers with 
external hires. External hires demonstrate superior ability to turn around bottom 
performing funds, but exhibit inferior ability to maintain the record of top performing 
funds. I find no cross-sectional difference in post-replacement performance between 
internal and external successors, indicating fund families, in general, make their 
replacement decisions optimally. I do, however, find that funds that deviate from the 
optimal decision have subsequent sub-par performance. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that portfolio managers play a pivotal role in determining mutual fund performance.  
 
JEL Classification: G23, J24, M54  
Keywords: Fund Manager, Fund Families, Manager Replacement, Fund Performance 
                                                          
*
 Linlin Ma, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, 35, Broad Street, Suite 
1214, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA. Email: lma2@gsu.edu. Tel: +1-404-413-7314. 
 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
Mutual fund managerial replacement is a critical event that often draws much 
attention. It consists of two parts: the displacement of the predecessor, and the placement 
of the successor. Prior literature has largely focused on the former.
1 
 Relatively little is 
known about how fund families make their succession decisions. In this paper, I assemble 
a unique dataset of 1,808 managerial replacement events between 1996 and 2010 to study 
the choice between hiring the successor from within (internal hire) and outside (external 
hire) the fund family. In particular, this study provides evidence on three related 
questions. (1) What are the factors that drive the decision of successor origin (i.e. internal 
versus external hire)? (2) Do factors such as the manager’s industry experience and 
educational background matter for the hiring decisions? (3) Do successor attributes relate 
to post-turnover fund performance? The answers to these questions shed light on the 
importance of portfolio managers to mutual fund performance.   
My analysis consists of three parts. The first part studies the determinants of internal 
versus external hire in light of the hiring models in labor economic theories. As 
summarized by Oyer and Schaefer (2011), hiring is the outcome of a matching process 
hindered by labor market frictions, such as asymmetric information, search costs, and 
training costs. An external hire possesses skills and traits that are desirable for funds in 
need of changing the status quo, but involves costly search and information asymmetry. 
                                                          
1
 The literature on fund managerial turnover focuses primarily on how effectively mutual fund 
families dismiss poorly performing managers. See, for example, Khorana (1996), Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999a), Lynch and Musto (2003), Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005), Ding and Wermers 
(2009), and Kostovetsky and Warner (2012). However, management changes can occur for reasons 
other than discipline. For instance, well-performing managers may leave in pursuit of more attractive 
job opportunities. Kostovetsky (2009) documents an increasing flight of top-performing managers 
from mutual funds to hedge funds. Hu, Hall and Harvey (2000) also suggest that well-performing 
managers can be promoted to a “better” (in their definition, larger) fund. 
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An internal hire provides the benefits of grooming the successor which greatly eases the 
transition and promotes continued good performance. The training costs associated with 
the grooming, however, can be non-trivial. The optimal choice of successor origin is 
determined by trading off the benefits against the costs. 
In support of the above arguments, I find that fund families prefer to replace their top 
performers with internal hires and bottom performers with external hires, suggesting fund 
families choose successors with traits to match the needs of the fund. Further, the 
probability of hiring externally decreases with family size and predecessor tenure but 
increases with fund family’s geographical proximity to a financial center. This finding 
indicates training costs and search costs influence hiring decisions in the labor market of 
mutual fund managers. I also find that publicly observable managerial traits, such as 
industry experience and educational background, play a particularly important role in the 
hiring of external managers since fund families must rely on more observable information 
when evaluating the ability of these managers.  
In the second part of my analysis, I examine the impact of successor origin on the 
subsequent fund performance. To justify the incentive of mutual fund families to hire 
externally, which is to turn around the poorly performing funds, I posit that external 
successors should exhibit a superior ability to improve the poorly performing funds 
compared to the internal ones. In contrast, when fund families replace a manager with an 
internal candidate for the well-performing funds, the value of grooming will predict that 
the internal successors are better at promoting continued good performance.   
Consistent with my expectations, I find that over the subsequent three years, external 
successors improve the annual abnormal performance (alpha) of the bottom-quartile 
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funds by 4.1% more than the internal ones do. When it comes to the top-quartile 
performing funds, however, external successors deteriorate the performance by 2.6% 
more than the internal ones do. This result is not simply driven by the mean-reversion in 
fund performance. Further, in support of the premise that external hires are more likely to 
change the job’s status quo, I show that external successors trade more frequently than 
the internal ones and have a greater tendency to diverge from fund’s original investment 
objectives. These findings remain after adjusting for the potential selection bias arising 
from the fact that the impact of successor origin choice on fund performance can be 
confounded by some unknown factors affecting the choice itself. 
In the last part of my analysis, I exploit cross-sectional differences in the post-
turnover performance between internal and external hires. Taken together, the above 
evidence confirms that there are benefits as well as costs associated with internal and 
external replacement of mutual fund managers. The decision of whether to hire from 
within or outside involves a trade-off between various benefits and costs. These benefits 
and costs differ across the sample funds, and such differences predict variations in the 
choice of successor origin. If the choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, we 
should observe no cross-sectional difference in the post-turnover performance between 
internal and external successors. Nevertheless, if, for some reason, a fund deviates from 
the optimal choice, we would expect that the sub-optimal decision leads to subsequent 
sub-par performance.  
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find external successors produce risk-adjusted 
returns that are indistinguishable from the ones produced by internal successors, 
indicating fund families, in general, make their replacement decisions optimally. I do, 
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however, find that funds that deviate from the expected decision (i.e. choose to internally 
hire when external hire is expected or vice versa) have subsequent sub-par performance. 
Further, I show that fund investors are cognizant of the deviation and punish such funds 
by withdrawing their capital.  
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, while the causes of managerial turnover 
have been studied in the mutual fund literature, the consequences of this critical event 
have not been carefully examined. Khorana (2001) finds that the performance of 
underperforming (well-performing) funds significantly improves (deteriorates) after 
managerial turnover using univariate comparisons. Kostovetsky and Warner (2012), 
however, find no evidence of performance improvement after managerial turnover using 
multivariate regression approach, raising doubts about fund families’ rationale for costly 
turnover of their portfolio managers. In this study, I strive to capture replacement 
decision more completely than previous research has and to enhance our understanding of 
the economic incentive of managerial replacement decisions. The argument I advance 
here is that it is not the manager turnover per se, but rather the succession decision that 
impacts the subsequent fund performance. Without taking the nature of the succession 
into account, the previous studies ignore an important part of the replacement decisions, 
and therefore generate inconsistent findings.  
Second, from a broader perspective, this paper aims to address the question of 
whether portfolio managers play a pivotal role in generating mutual fund performance. 
Popular press pays much attention to portfolio managers, reporting their profiles, 
researching their investment philosophies, and tracking their job changes. The high media 
coverage suggests that portfolio managers are critical to value creation for the fund. In 
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addition, when mutual fund families describe their investment process, most of them 
claim that the portfolio managers have the final say when it comes to buying or selling a 
stock in the portfolio (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2012). Yet, existing empirical studies 
typically rely on fund-, family-, and market-level characteristics to explain fund 
performance and largely ignore the possible role that individual managers may play in 
generating the performance outcomes. One of the reasons could be the widespread belief 
that mutual fund managers lack stock picking skills. Starting with Jensen (1968), prior 
studies consistently find actively managed mutual funds, on average, underperform their 
benchmarks and therefore conclude that active managers do not have skills. Moreover, 
while several papers find persistence in fund performance over short horizons of one to 
three years,
2
 Carhart (1997) argues that the persistence of performance is largely driven 
by the persistence in fees and momentum in stock returns.  
A strand of recent literature, however, provides some evidence of managerial skill in 
the mutual fund industry. For instance, Wermers (2000) finds that the stocks that mutual 
funds hold outperform broad market indices. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find 
that the stocks that mutual fund managers buy outperform the stocks that they sell. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that the amount a fund deviates from its benchmark is 
positively associated with fund performance. There is also evidence suggesting where the 
skills come from. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and Gottesman and Morey 
(2006) document a positive relation between manager educational background and fund 
performance. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that geography matters as funds that 
invest in more local stocks do better. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), and Huang 
                                                          
2
See, for example, Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), and 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995). 
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and Kale (2013) find that funds with better product market information perform better. 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) find that portfolio managers perform significantly 
better on the holdings for which they are connected through social network. Agarwal, 
Boyson, and Naik (2009) find that mutual fund managers with experience implementing 
hedge fund strategies perform better. These studies suggest that managerial superior 
performance is likely due to superior knowledge and information. These studies, however, 
do not provide direct evidence on managers’ effects on fund performance. The superior 
performance can be simply due to implementation of strategies that are chosen by fund 
families. Since one can never observe performance outcomes of managers and funds 
independently, but instead only in conjunction with each other (Baks, 2003), “the 
empirical distinction between funds and managers need not be trivial” (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1999b).  
In this paper, I take a new approach to investigate the extent to which portfolio 
manager matters for fund performance by looking into the performance consequences 
following managerial replacements. This identification strategy has two potential 
advantages. First, by focusing on managerial replacements, I can compare the fund 
performance before and after the event, which is a more direct way to quantify the effect 
of different managers on fund performance. Second, in the setting of managerial 
replacements, it is reasonable to argue that the funds and families stay the same, with the 
managers being different. Thus, any change in fund performance should be more likely 
due to the manager effect.  
Third, my study adds to a growing body of labor economic literature that recognizes 
the importance of hiring decisions in the labor market. While extensive theoretical work 
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is devoted to understanding firms’ hiring decisions, few empirical studies underpin the 
theoretical development.
3
 One obvious reason is data limitation. My work contributes to 
this strand of literature by examining the empirical implications of hiring models using a 
unique yet unexplored setting: labor market for mutual fund managers. The labor market 
for mutual fund managers appears to be an attractive setting to study the hiring decision 
for at least three reasons. First, the employment history of portfolio managers is 
publically available, so tracking their personal traits is relatively easy. Second, there is a 
direct link between managerial actions (investment decisions) and outcome (fund 
performance), which allows me to clearly identify the impact of hiring on subsequent 
fund performance. Last, but not least, mutual fund companies are human capital intensive 
and hiring the right manager is an important (if not the most important) determinant of 
their success (Barney, 1991). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops the hypotheses. 
Section III describes the data, variable construction, and summary statistics. Section IV 
presents the results on the determinants of successor origins. Section V examines the 
impact of successor origin on the subsequent change in fund performance. Section VI 
analyzes the cross-sectional difference in the post-turnover performance between internal 
and external hires. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. Hypotheses Development 
A. Benefits 
                                                          
3
 There is a reasonably large empirical literature on hiring decisions for chief executive officers (CEO). 
Oyer and Schaefer (2011), however, claim that the market for CEOs is markedly different from other 
rank-and-file employees and this literature needs more studies in other “specific labor markets”.  
8 
 
Labor economists have long identified the main economic problem in any type of 
hiring decisions (therefore succession decisions included) involves matching in the 
presence of frictions in the labor market, such as asymmetric information, search costs, 
and training costs (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). Job matching theory (see among others, 
Jovanovic, 1979a, 1979b; Rosen, 1982; Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 
2013) suggests that there are neither good workers, nor are there good employers; there 
are only good matches. Good matches are formed when firms with idiosyncratic needs 
for employee skill sets hire a job candidate with the required set of skills. Good matches 
are value-enhancing. In equilibrium, firms hire an external (internal) candidate when they 
believe the attributes of the external (internal) candidate best match their specific needs 
for the vacant job.  
One well documented attribute that differentiates external candidates from internal 
candidates is their ability to significantly change the job’s status quo (e.g., Parrino, 1997; 
Khurana and Nohria, 2000; Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Jin and Scherbina, 2010; Pan and 
Wang, 2012). On one hand, external candidates, by virtue of their experience at other 
firms, are more likely to bring new ideas and fresh perspectives. On the other hand, 
external candidates, who have zero contribution to the job’s status quo and no political 
alliances with coworkers, are less constrained to implement those new ideas.  
In the setting of mutual fund managers, job matching theory therefore suggests that a 
key determinant of external hiring is fund performance. When the managerial turnover is 
following a period of underperformance (most likely forced turnover of the predecessor), 
fund companies prefer to hire externally so that the incoming manager brings new 
perspectives and investment philosophies that help to turn around the bad performance. 
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In contrast, internal hiring is more likely when the fund is performing well (most likely a 
voluntary turnover of the predecessor) and therefore a continuation of good performance 
is needed. In the case of internal replacements, the successor has the opportunity to obtain 
“on-the-job training” from the predecessor. The “grooming” can greatly ease the manager 
transition and promote continued good performance. The above argument forms the basis 
of my first two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Mutual fund advisors are more likely to hire externally for the 
underperforming funds and internally for the well-performing funds. 
Hypothesis 2: External successors exhibit superior ability to turnaround the 
underperforming funds, whereas internal successors demonstrate better ability to 
maintain the good record of well-performing funds.   
B. Costs 
In a perfect labor market, the matching process leads to an ex-ante optimal manager-
fund match at all times. However, labor market frictions such as training costs and search 
costs hinder the efficient matching. For instance, unlike large fund advisors such as 
Fidelity, who have a complete internal training system (interns to buy-side analysts to 
portfolio managers), smaller fund families, who have limited resources, may not be able 
to afford the internal training costs. This limitation on internal talent can impede hiring 
from within and thus reduce the incidence of internal replacements for smaller advisors. 
By the same token, the supply of external candidates can play a key role in determining 
the choice of successor origin. Fund advisors who are located in close proximity to the 
financial centers such as Boston or New York have access to a larger pool of external 
candidates, and thus are less constrained to hire from outside. The same argument, 
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however, cannot be made for advisors that are distant from those financial hubs. In 
addition, predecessors who have longer tenure at the fund may have a greater opportunity 
to groom their successors from inside the fund families. Thus, I expect greater likelihood 
of internal succession for funds with longer-tenured predecessors. I formalize my third 
hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of observing external replacements decreases with 
family size and predecessor tenure but increases with advisor’s geographical proximity 
to a financial center.  
Another labor market friction, namely asymmetric information, may also impede 
efficient matching (Greenwald, 1986). In general, asymmetric information refers to the 
situation where two trading partners have different information about the economic 
transaction. Regarding hiring in the labor market, asymmetric information arises when 
job candidates have more information about their productivities than the firm does and 
firms cannot costlessly verify the information. As a result, job candidates, the better 
informed party, can exploit the information advantage at the expense of overall efficiency. 
For instance, potential job candidates may misrepresent their quality by fabricating their 
credentials or over-polishing their resumes.  
Labor markets are, of course, heterogeneous. The extent to which asymmetric 
information is prevalent is likely to vary. One can argue that asymmetric information is 
less severe in the hiring decisions of portfolio managers since their past performance and 
partial investment decisions are publically observable. However, Fama and French (2010) 
claim that part of the fund performance can be attributed to luck rather than skill. 
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Lakonishok et al. (1991), among others, show that portfolio managers can window-dress 
their disclosed portfolio. Therefore, asymmetric information remains a concern. 
Given the concern of information disadvantage, firms should prefer to hire 
candidates about whom they have more accurate information on. As a result, internal 
candidates have an advantage over external candidates in filling the vacant position, 
ceteris paribus. This is because not only firms have more information about the internal 
candidates: the information they have is also less noisy. One way firms can reduce the 
uncertainty regarding external candidates is to require stronger observable indicators of 
abilities. Though not an exhaustive list, such indictors include manager’s industry 
experience and educational background. Both industry experience and educational 
background are expected to be positively related to managerial ability for the following 
three mutually non-exclusive reasons. First, managers with longer industry experience 
and better educational background may have superior innate ability (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1999b). Because of the superior ability, they self-select to attend a better school 
and are more likely to survive longer in the industry. Second, managers can obtain 
knowledge from both the experience and the education, and thus enhance their trading 
skills. Third, the social networks acquired through professional activities and schooling 
may help managers obtain private information which in turn help the stock picking 
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2007).   
I summarize the above argument in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: External hires have stronger observable indicators of ability, such as 
industry experience and educational background, than internal hires. 
C. Costs/benefits Trade-off 
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Taken together, the above hypotheses suggest that there are benefits as well as costs 
associated with both internal and external replacement of mutual fund managers.  The 
decision of whether to hire within the fund family or to search outside involves a trade-
off between various costs and benefits. These benefits and costs differ across the sample 
funds, and such difference predicts variations in their choice of successor career origins. 
If the choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, then we should observe no cross-
sectional difference in the subsequent performance between the internal and external 
successors, after controlling for fund and manager characteristics. If internal (external) 
hires produced systematically higher risk-adjusted returns than external (internal) ones, 
we would expect all funds to hire internally (externally). The external (internal) hiring 
mode will be completely competed out of the marketplace. This is, obviously, not 
consistent with what we observe empirically. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: Internal successors produce risk-adjusted returns that are 
indistinguishable from the risk-adjusted returns produced by external successors. 
Note that this hypothesis is built on the assumption that mutual fund industry is 
perfectly competitive. This may not be true as pointed out by Warner and Wu (2004). 
Market frictions such as search and switching costs can deter investors from punishing 
the funds. It is conceivable, then, some funds might deviate from the optimal decision 
without being immediately competed out of the marketplace. If, for some reason, a fund 
reaches a sub-optimal succession decision (i.e. choose to hire internally when external 
hire is optimal or vice versa), we should expect this decision to lead to subsequent sub-
par performance. This argument leads to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 6:  The performance of funds that are predicted to have an external 
(internal) hire and hired from outside (within) should outperform the ones are predicted 
to have an external (internal) hire but hire from within (outside). 
III. Data, Variable Construction, and Summary Statistics 
A. Data 
My primary data source is the Morningstar Direct Mutual Fund (Morningstar) 
database. This survivorship-bias-free database covers the U.S. open-end mutual funds 
and provides information about fund names, family names, returns, assets, expense ratios, 
portfolio turnover ratios, manager names, manager biographies, investment objectives, 
fund tickers, fund CUSIPs, and other fund characteristics. I rely primarily on the 
Morningstar database rather than on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
Mutual Fund database for two reasons. First, manager name, a key input of this study, is 
more accurate in the Morningstar database compared with the CRSP database (Massa, 
Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 2010). Second, a short manager biography is provided to describe 
each manager’s industry experience and educational background in the Morningstar 
database. This information is not available in the CRSP database. My initial sample 
consists of 4,096 U.S. open-end equity mutual funds managed by 7,686 portfolio 
managers in 1,265 mutual fund companies, covering 33,014 fund-year observations 
between 1996 and 2010.
4
  
To construct the sample of funds with managerial replacement, I track the changes of 
manager names to identify managerial turnover. I use the month in which at least one 
                                                          
4
Multiple share classes are listed as separate funds in the Morningstar database. To avoid multiple 
counting, we aggregate the share-class level data to portfolio level, using the identifier, FundID. 
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manager name is different from the one(s) in the previous month as the event month for 
my empirical analyses. I exclude the cases when there are multiple managerial 
replacements for one fund. To avoid cases of interim replacement, I require that (a) the 
predecessor has at least 6-month tenure in the funds preceding the turnover, and (b) the 
successor stays with the fund for at least 6 months after the replacement. I also require 
information on the industry experience and educational background available for the 
succeeding managers. Using this criterion, the replacement sample includes a total of 
1,808 managerial replacement events. 
B. Variable Constructions 
B.1. Performance Measures 
To evaluate the mutual fund performance, I use four-factor alpha (αi) estimated using 
the Carhart (1997) model:  
, , , , , , , , ,( ) (1)i t f t i i m m t f t i s i h i mom t i tR R R R SMB HML MOM              
where , ,i t f tR R  is the return of the fund i in month t minus the risk free rate; and      
, ,m t f tR R  
is the excess return of the market over the risk free rate; SMB is the return 
difference between small and large capitalization stocks; HML is the return difference 
between high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM is the return difference between 
the stocks with high and low past returns.
5
 The factor loadings are calculated using fund 
net-of-fee returns in the previous 36 months. The four-factor alpha has been widely used 
in the literature to measure the risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds. 
                                                          
5
 I thank Professor Kenneth French for making the returns on the market, risk-free rate, and the three 
factors (size, book-to-market, and momentum) available on his website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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As a robustness check, I also compute the category-adjusted return which equals the 
monthly fund return less the average monthly return of all the funds in the corresponding 
Morningstar Category. The use of the category-adjusted return is consistent with the 
argument that, in making managerial replacement decisions, mutual fund companies 
benchmark a manager’s performance against the performance of “similar” funds in the 
industry. All of my results are robust to this alternative performance measure. Both the 
statistical and economic significance are consistent and qualitatively similar.  
B.2. Flows Measures 
I construct my net flows measure following Sirri and Tufano (1998). It is defined as 
the growth in total net assets (TNA) net of internal return as in equation (2), assuming all 
dividends and other distributions are reinvested at the realized annual return for the fund. 
Berk and Tonks (2007) claim that the way Sirri and Tufano (1998) construct net flows is 
incorrect because it attributes some of the change in flows to the change due to internal 
growth. They propose a new measure of net flows where it has TNAi,t-1 (1+ri,t) rather than 
TNAi,t-1 in the denominator. My results are consistent and qualitatively similar, no matter 
which measure I employ. 
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B.3. Successor Attributes 
Successor attributes are hand-collected from managers’ biographies provided by the 
Morningstar database. Three publicly observable managerial traits are considered in the 
paper. The first one is career origin which refers to whether the new manager comes 
from inside or outside the mutual fund companies. A manager is categorized to be 
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external successor if she is hired from outside the fund company and internal if she is 
hired from within. Another important managerial characteristic is industry experience 
which is defined as the number of years that a manager has been working in the asset 
management industry. Three variables are generated to capture manager’s educational 
background. The first is the median composite SAT score (as of 2010) for the manager’s 
undergraduate institution. Most schools report upper and lower bounds for the reading, 
math, and writing sections. The bounds are supposed to be constructed so that the median 
students lie in between. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), I approximate each 
school’s composite SAT score as the sum of the average of the upper and lower bounds 
for the three sections. The second variable is the median composite GMAT score (as of 
2010) of the graduate institution attended by the manager, if available, following 
Gottesman and Morey (2006).
6
 Lastly, I construct an MBA dummy that equals one if the 
successor has an M.B.A. degree and zero otherwise. These three variables of managerial 
educational background are used to proxy the manager’s innate ability, connections, and 
the quality of her training. 
The following is an example that illustrates how I obtain the information on 
successor attributes. In November 2009, T. Rowe Price replaced its veteran manager 
Charles Ober with Timothy Parker, an equity analyst at T. Rowe Price, for the New Era 
Fund. In Morningstar database, a short biography is provided for Timothy Parker. It says 
that “Mr. Parker joined the Firm in 2001. He has served as an equity research analyst and 
then a portfolio manager (beginning in 2010)”. From the biography, I also learn that Mr. 
                                                          
6
 To construct the composite SAT score, I mainly use the website: http://www.collegeboard.org/. To 
obtain the composite GMAT score, I mainly use the website: http://businessschools.college-
scholarships.com/. I also use some schools’ websites as supplementary data sources. 
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Parker earned an M.B.A. degree as well as a B.S. degree from University of Virginia. 
Based on the above sketches, I conclude that Timothy Parker is an internal successor, has 
10 years of industry experience, and went to an M.B.A program that requires median 
GMAT score of 680 and an undergraduate institution with 2,040 median composite SAT 
score requirement.  
B.4. Other Variables 
Other variables are defined as follows. Fund Assets is the market value of assets held 
by the fund at the end of each month. Expense Ratio equals the fund’s operating expenses 
divided by the average monthly assets. Portfolio Turnover Ratio is computed by taking 
the lesser of purchases or sales by the fund and dividing it by the average monthly net 
assets. Family Assets is the market value of assets held by all the equity funds in the 
family at the end of each month. Team is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund 
is managed by a team of portfolio managers and zero otherwise. Tenure is the number of 
years that a manager has been at the helm of a mutual fund.  
C. Summary Statistics 
On average, 1.3% of portfolio managers get replaced each month which translates 
into an annual manager turnover rate of 15.6%. While mutual fund families mainly rely 
on the internal labor markets to fill their staffing needs (68.1% of the sample), a 
significant fraction of positions are filled from the outside (31.9%).  
[Insert Table I about here] 
Table I reports the summary statistics of the characteristics for all the sample funds. 
A typical fund in my sample has annualized four-factor alpha of -0.54% and category-
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adjusted return of -0.45%. On average, the sample fund has an expense ratio of 1.34% 
and portfolio turnover ratio of 112.28%. The annual net flows are on average 8.4% of the 
fund assets. Fund assets and family assets are positively skewed, thus I use the natural 
logarithm of these two variables in all my empirical tests.  
As far as the manager characteristics are concerned, a typical sample fund has about 
two team members running the fund. Portfolio managers in my sample have been 
working in the asset management industry for an average 13 years. The average tenure of 
the portfolio managers is 4.5 years.  About 77% of my sample managers hold an M.B.A. 
degree. The average GMAT score of managers’ graduate institutions is about 668 and the 
average SAT score of managers’ undergraduate institutions is about 1,881. All the 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentile levels.  
 [Insert Table II about here] 
Table II reports the sample distribution by Morningstar Category. Morningstar 
Category is assigned based on the underlying securities in the fund over the previous 
three years. The majority of funds in my sample are Large-Cap funds which represent 
54.6% of the sample. The sample also consists of Mid-Cap funds (23.1%) and Small-Cap 
funds (21.1%). I also have 23 Sector funds in the sample, which represent 1% of the 
sample. There are 297 cases (16.4% of the sample funds) where managers change the 
investment objectives of the funds in the subsequent three years after the replacement 
event. As a result, the Morningstar Category in the post-turnover period is different from 
the one in the pre-turnover period. I refer to this event as “style drift” in the study. The 
variable Style Drift is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund changes its investment 
objective in the three years after the manager turnover, and zero otherwise.  
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[Insert Table III about here] 
As shown in Table III, the management companies’ locations span most of the major 
financial centers. I first rank cities by the number of fund families that are located in each 
for all the domestic equity funds in the Morningstar database. As can be seen, New York 
and Boston dominate the mutual fund landscape. There are 189 (14.9%) and 152 (12.0%) 
mutual fund families in New York and Boston, respectively. Other major mutual fund 
cities include Chicago (5.7%), Philadelphia (63%), San Francisco (4.0%), Los Angeles 
(3.2%), Milwaukee (2.8%), Baltimore (2.8%), and Houston (2.8%). The rest of the 
mutual fund families are lumped together in “Rest of Cities”; this category comprises 
46.9% of the sample. Similar pattern can be found for the sample of funds with 
managerial replacement. To measure the geographical advantage of accessing external 
talent, I construct the indicator variable, Financial Center, which equals one if the mutual 
fund family is located in those top 10 cities and zero if it is located in the rest of cities.  
D. Univariate Comparisons 
Table IV presents a univariate comparison of various fund characteristics between 
internal successors and external successors. Overall, the descriptive evidence reveals 
significant differences in fund characteristics between the two groups. In the pre-turnover 
period, funds that choose to hire externally underperform the ones that acquired by an 
internal successor. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Compared with the 
internal successors, external ones tend to acquire smaller, more expensive, and active 
funds. Notably, consistent with Hypothesis 3, both the family size and the predecessor 
tenure are greater for funds with internal successors than the ones with external hires. 
Lastly, I find that consistent with my expectations in Hypothesis 4, compared with 
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internal succession, external succession requires the incoming manager to have stronger 
observable indicators of ability, such as longer industry experience and better educational 
background, which presumably reduce the information uncertainty. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
IV. Determinants of Successor Origin 
As the first step in my analysis, I investigate the determinants of successor career 
origin (i.e. internal versus external hire). As discussed in the Hypotheses Development 
section, a key determinant of external hiring should be fund performance. When the 
managerial turnover is following a period of underperformance, fund companies are more 
likely to hire externally so that the incoming manager bring new perspective and 
investment philosophies that help to turn around the bad performance. In contrast, 
internal hire is more likely when the fund is performing well and therefore continuation 
of good performance is needed, as the successor has the opportunity to obtain “grooming” 
from the predecessor which greatly eases the transition and promotes continued good 
performance.  
Mutual fund families are heterogeneous and face different costs associated with 
internal and external recruiting. Smaller families have greater training costs, thus are less 
likely to hire from within. Fund families that are located in close proximity to the 
financial centers have access to a larger pool of external candidates, therefore are less 
constrained to hire from outside. Predecessors who have longer tenure at the fund may 
have a greater opportunity to groom their successors from inside the fund families. Thus, 
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I expect greater likelihood of internal succession for funds with longer-tenured 
predecessors. 
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3, I employ a probit regression modeling the 
likelihood of a fund whose manager gets replaced by an external candidate at time t. The 
probit model specification is as follows:
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where i  indexes mutual funds and t  indexes time. The dependent variable ,i ty  is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if she is 
an internal successor. I first measure the past fund performance as the four-factor alpha 
defined in Section III, over the past 36 months. To test the possibility that the relation 
between the past performance and the choice of successor origin is not linear, I also use 
the relative performance as alternative performance measure. 
 I divide the sample into three groups based on the fund’s previous three year’s 
performance. The top performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in 
the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes the funds whose performance 
ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance quartiles are combined into 
one group. Top, Bottom, and Middle are indicator variables that equal one if the fund 
performance belongs to the top, bottom, or middle performance group, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. Note that the indicator variable Middle is not included in the regression 
because the middle group serves as the base case for the top and bottom groups. The 
estimated coefficients for Top and Bottom show the effects of being top and bottom 
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performers on the likelihood of external replacement relative to being the middle 
performers, respectively. I control for other fund and manager characteristics including 
fund assets, expense ratio, portfolio turnover ratio, and whether a fund is managed by a 
team of managers or not. All the independent variables are measured one month prior to 
the turnover event. I include both the category dummies and year dummies in the 
regression, and cluster the standard errors at the fund level. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
I report the results in Table V. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the estimated 
coefficient on variable Four-factor Alpha is negative (Coef. =-0.033) and significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that fund families are more likely to choose an external hire over 
an internal hire for an underperforming fund.  This finding is further confirmed in 
Column (2). The coefficient on the indicator variable Bottom is 0.761 and significant at 
the 1% level. In contrast, the coefficient on the indicator variable Top is -0.139, 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting internal (external) replacements are preferable for 
well (poorly)-performing funds. An F-test of equality of the coefficients on Top and 
Bottom is strongly rejected at 1% significance level. In terms of the economic magnitude, 
for a typical fund in the sample, one-standard-deviation decrease in the Four-factor Alpha 
is associated with an increase in the probability of external hire by 13.9%.  A change of 
ranking from the middle quartiles to the bottom (top) quartile is associated with an 
increase (decrease) in the implied probability of external replacement by 27.9% (4.4%). 
Further, the implied probability of external hire by keeping all fund characteristics at the 
mean level is only 29.3%, suggesting ceteris paribus, fund families prefer internal hire 
over external hire. 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find that the coefficient on the natural logarithm of 
family size to be negative (Coef. =-0.060) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
external hiring is associated with smaller fund families. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the natural logarithm of family size is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of external hire by 4.5%. I also find that the coefficient on the predecessor 
tenure is negative (Coef. =-0.032) and significant at the 1% level. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that longer-tenured predecessors are more likely to groom an 
internal candidate to be the succeeding managers. Further, the coefficient on the dummy 
variable Financial Center is positive (Coef. =0.687) and significant at the 1% level. This 
finding confirms that fund families that are located in close proximity to the financial 
centers are more likely to hire externally. I do not find any significant difference between 
internal and external hire for their distribution patterns in categories or years. 
V. Successor Origin and Change in Performance 
Having examined the determinants of successor origin, I now turn to examine its 
impact on the subsequent fund performance. To justify the incentive for mutual fund 
families to hire externally, which is to turn around the poorly performing funds, I posit 
that external successors should exhibit a superior ability to improve the bottom 
performing funds compared to the internal ones. In contrast, when fund families replace a 
manager with an internal candidate for the well-performing funds, the value of grooming 
will predict that the internal successors are better at promoting continued good 
performance.   
To test the above predictions, I divide the sample into three groups based on the 
fund’s previous three year’s performance. The top performance group includes the funds 
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whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes 
the funds whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance 
quartiles are combined into one group. For each of the subsample, I run the following test: 
, 1 , , 1 , (4)i t i t i t i tPerf External Controls       
where i  indexes mutual funds, and t  indexes time. The dependent variable Perf  is the 
change of fund performance from the pre-replacement period (i.e., month t-36 to t-1) to 
the post-replacement period (i.e., month t+1 to t+36). To ascertain that the post-turnover 
improvement or deterioration in fund performance is related to true managerial ability 
rather than mean reversion in fund performance, I employ a matched-sample-based 
performance measure. For each fund in my sample, I identify a fund with similar 
performance record over the 36-month period preceding the turnover event and with 
same investment style, but does not experience management shakeup in the subsequent 
period. I then subtract the change in performance of the matched sample from the 
corresponding change in performance for the replacement sample fund.  
The independent variable of interest External equals one if a succeeding manager is 
hired from outside the fund family and zero if she is hired from within. The regression 
controls for other fund characteristics such as fund size, expense ratio, portfolio turnover 
ratio, family size, team management, successor’s experience, and successor’s educational 
background.
7
 I include both the category dummies and year dummies, and cluster the 
standard errors at the fund level. 
                                                          
7
 Note that I did not include the interaction of External and Experience (or Education) because the 
interaction terms and External is highly collinear.   
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One possible source of bias in regression (4) is that the choice of the successor types 
is not random. Since the selection process of the successors is unobserved, the impact of 
successor types on fund performance could be confounded by some unknown factors 
affecting the choice of the successor types. I deal with this selection problem by 
employing a treatment effect model à la Heckman two-step method. The first stage of the 
model is a probit specification as in equation (3) that analyzes how fund families make 
the choice of the successor career origin. The estimated parameters are used to calculate 
the selection hazard Inverse Mills Ratio, which is then included as an additional 
explanatory variable in regression of (4).  
[Insert Table VI about here] 
The results are reported in Table VI. Consistent with the incentive for mutual fund 
families to hire externally, I find that external successors demonstrate better ability to 
improve the performance of the poorly performing funds. Compared with internal 
successors, external ones improve the annual four-factor alpha for the bottom performers 
by 4.1% over the subsequent three-year window, significant at the 1% level. Similar 
effect can be found for the middle quartile group. For the sample of top-performing funds, 
however, external successors exhibit inferior ability to continue the good performance. 
On average, the external successors decrease the annual four-factor alpha for the top 
performers by 2.6% more than the internal ones do, which is significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, external successors, compared to the internal ones, have a greater tendency to 
change the fund’s performance. The results for the entire sample are reported in the last 
column. The inverse mills ratio for the choice of external successors is significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that the difference in subsequent change in performance between 
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internal and external successors is partially driven by the selection process. Therefore, 
throughout the paper, I control for the selection bias in my empirical specifications by 
including the Inverse Mills Ratio that estimated from equation (3). 
To further test the channel through which external hires change the fund’s status quo, 
I compare the level of trading activities between internal and external hires. I measure the 
level of trading activity using two variables. The first variable, Style Drift, is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if a fund changes its investment objective from the pre-
turnover period to the post-turnover period, and zero otherwise. Style drift occurs when a 
fund diverges from its original investment style and is mostly caused by intentional asset 
reallocation by the portfolio managers. The second variable is the annual portfolio 
turnover ratio in the post-replacement period. It is defined as the percentage of fund 
holdings that have been replaced with other holdings in a given year. It is computed by 
taking the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities of less than 
one year) and dividing by average monthly net assets. It is reported on an annual basis 
and can be retrieved from mutual fund’s financial highlights in the annual report.  
I use similar probit regression as in equation (3) to model the tendency to drift in 
style and use similar OLS specification as in equation (4) to model the difference in 
trading frequencies between internal versus external hires.  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
I report the results in Table VII. Consistent with my predictions, I find that external 
successors trade more frequently than the internal ones and are more likely to diverge 
from fund’s original investment style. The estimated slope coefficients on External are 
both positive and highly significant. These findings support the premise that external 
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managers have a greater tendency to change the fund’s status quo. Not surprisingly, I also 
find bad performance leads to more active trading in the subsequent period. Results also 
suggest that a manager’s undergraduate quality is another variable that is positively 
related to the trading activity.  
VI. Successor Origin and Cross-sectional Performance 
As discussed in the Hypothesis Development section, there are benefits as well as 
costs associated with external and internal succession of mutual fund managers. The 
decision of whether to hire within or to search outside involves a trade-off between 
various costs and benefits. These benefits and costs differ across the sample funds, and 
such difference predicts variations in their choice of successor career origins. If the 
choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, then we should observe no cross-sectional 
difference in the subsequent performance between the internal and external successors, 
after controlling for fund and manager characteristics. 
If for some reason, however, a fund reaches a sub-optimal succession decision (e.g. 
replacing its managers internally when the costs of internal hire are high and the benefits 
are minimal), we would expect that this deviation from the optimal decision leads to 
subsequent sub-par performance for the fund.  
To test the above two hypotheses, I employ the following empirical specification: 
   
 
, 1 , , , 1 ,( ) (5)i t i t i t i t i tPerf External Deviation Controls      
where i  indexes mutual funds and t  indexes time. The dependent variable Perf is fund 
performance in the post-replacement period (i.e., month t+1 to t+36). The first variable 
of interst is External that is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an 
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external successor and zero if she is an internal successor. The second variable of interest 
is Deviation from the expected decision, which is measured by the absolute difference 
between the actual decision of the manager origin (0 or 1) and the predicted probability 
generated from probit regression (3). The intuition is illustrated in the following example. 
One of the funds in my sample has a sub-par performance during the past three years 
(Four-factor Alpha=-14.5%), belongs to a small fund family (Ln Family Assets=20.9), 
and is located in New York (Fin Center=1). In the probit regression (3), this fund is 
predicted to have a probability of 68.3% to hire externally. If indeed, the succesor is hired 
from outside the firm (i.e. External=1), the deviation measure will be 31.7%. If, however, 
the successor is hired from within (i.e. External=0), the deviation measure will be 68.3%.  
Greater value of the deviation measure suggests further distance from the predicted 
decision, and therefore may negatively affect the fund performance. To help to ease the 
concern of nonlinearity of the relation between fund performance and deviation, I also 
contruct a deviation dummy that equals one if the deviation is greater than the 50%, and 
zero otherwise. I also controlled for other variables that might affect the fund 
performance. These variables include the manager’s industry experience and educational 
background, the fund’s past performance, family size, financial center, fund size, expense 
ratio, portfolio turnover ratio, team management and category as well as year dummies. 
The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
The results are reported in Table VIII.  Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the estimated 
coefficient on External in column one is insignificant, suggesting no cross-sectional 
difference in the post-turnover performance between the internal and external successors. 
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The coefficient on the indicator variable External is -0.126 and it is not statistically 
significant at the conventional level (p-value=66.4%). The coefficient on the deviation 
from the predicted probability, however, is negative (Coef. =-1.336) and significant at the 
5% level, suggesting deviation from the optimal decision leads to subsequent sub-par 
performance for the fund. Similar conclusion can be made if I use the deviation dummy 
variable instead. Further, the quality of the successor’s undergraduate institution 
positively relates to the post-turnover performance.  This confirms the idea that 
manager’s education background is positively related to their innate ability of stock 
picking.  
As the last step of the analysis, I compare the difference in the net flows between 
internal and external successions. In particular, I aim to test when funds execute a sub-
optimal succession decision that is far away from investor’s expectation, whether 
investors punish the funds by withdrawing their money. The empirical specification is 
similar to the one used in regression (5) except the dependent variable is net flows 
defined as in equation (2), instead of fund performance. To account for the convex flow-
performance relation (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), I include an additional control variable 
which is the quadratic term of the fund’s past performance. 
[Insert Table IX about here] 
The results are reported in Table IX. I find no significant difference in net flows 
between internal and external successions. The coefficient on the indicator variable 
External is -0.195 and it is not statistically significant at the conventional level (p-
value=27.9%). However, when the funds deviate from their predicted choice, investors 
punish the fund by withdrawing their capital. The coefficient on the Deviation from 
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predicted probability is -5.146, significant at the 5% level. I find similar results when I 
use the alternative deviation dummy variable.  
VII. Conclusion 
Departing from prior literature on portfolio manager turnover which largely focuses 
on the firing decisions, this paper highlights the importance of the hiring decisions. The 
results suggest that it is not the manager turnover per se, but rather the succession 
decisions that impact the subsequent fund performance. By shifting the focus to the 
choice of the successors, I extend previous research and enhance our understanding of the 
economic incentives of managerial replacement decisions. In particular, the evidence 
suggests that the match between the successor and the fund is influenced by the needs of 
the fund and the manager’s attributes, and manager attributes in turn play a key role in 
determining the subsequent fund performance.  
Another objective of this paper is to address the question of whether portfolio 
managers are important in generating mutual fund performance. Portfolio managers are 
heterogeneous in background, experience, innate abilities, and investment philosophies. 
Thus, some of them will be a better “fit” with a fund than others. Prior studies have 
suggested that the empirical identification of manager heterogeneity and its effect on fund 
performance is challenging as one can never observe the manager effect and fund effect 
separately. I present an empirical framework to analyze this issue by looking into the 
performance consequences following managerial replacements. In this setting, it is 
reasonable to argue that the fund stays the same, with the managers being different. Thus, 
any change in fund performance should be more likely due to the manager effect. I find, 
compared with their counterparts, successors that come from outside the fund families 
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demonstrate better ability to improve the performance of the bottom performers but 
inferior ability to maintain the performance of the top performers. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that portfolio managers play a pivotal role in determining mutual fund 
performance. 
While extensive theoretical work is devoted to understanding firms’ hiring decisions, 
relatively few empirical studies underpin the theoretical development. My work 
contributes to the labor economics literature by testing some of the implications of the 
hiring model using a unique yet unexplored setting: the labor market for mutual fund 
managers. This study provides evidence on how firms find the right employees in the first 
place. By doing so, it also sheds light on the importance of hiring decisions in the 
managerial labor market.  
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics (Panel A) and the correlation matrix (Panel B) of the characteristics for all 
the 1,808 sample funds. The sample period is between 1996 and 2010. Four-factor Alpha equals the average 
annulized four-factor alpha as defined in equation (1) over the previous three years.  Categoty-adj. Return is equal to 
the average annual fund return less the average annual return of all the funds in the corresponding Morningstar 
Category, over the prior three years. Fund Assets is the market value of assets held by the fund by the end of the 
month. Ln Fund Assets is the natural logarithm of one plus Fund Assets. Expense Ratio equals the fund’s operating 
expenses divided by the average monthly assets. Turnover Ratio is computed by taking the lesser of purchases or 
sales by the fund and divided it by the average monthly net assets. Net Flows is defined as in equation (2), which is 
the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends. Family Assets is the market value of assets held by all the 
equity funds in the family by the end of each month. Ln Family Assets is the natural logarithm of one plus Family 
Assets. Predecessor Tenure is the number of years that the predecessor has been at the helm of the mutual fund. 
Successor Experience is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry. 
SAT is the median composite SAT score (as of 2010) reported by the manager’s undergraduate institution. GMAT is 
the median composite GMAT score (as of 2010) of new entrants at the graduate institution attended by the manager. 
MBA is a dummy variable that equals one if the manager has an M.B.A degree and zero otherwise. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentile levels. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%  is indicated by 
***,**, and * respectively. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
      Quartiles 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Fund Characteristics 
       
Four-factor Alpha (%) -0.54 11.4 -30.5 -4.97 -1.85 1.45 65.66 
Category-adj. Return (%) -0.45 5.77 -19.74 -3.03 -0.45 2.01 18.5 
Ln Fund Assets  18.32 2.26 15.03 16 18.28 20.18 23.53 
Expense Ratio (%) 1.34 0.43 0.37 1.01 1.32 1.6 2.53 
Turnover Ratio (%) 112.28 88.94 3.9 55 94 141 560 
Net Flows (%) 8.35 34.73 -65.13 -9.29 -2.93 18.38 174.72 
Ln Family Assets  21.74 2.36 16.4 20 21.43 23.52 26.66 
Manager Characteristics 
       Predecessor Tenure 4.49 3.53 1 2 3.25 5.83 18.75 
Successor Experience 13 7.35 2 7 12 19 34 
SAT/100 18.81 2.4 13 17.4 19.05 20.9 22.35 
GMAT/100 6.68 0.66 5 6.33 6.91 7.19 7.3 
MBA 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 1 1 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Four-factor Alpha (1) 1                       
Cat-adj. Return (2) 0.37*** 1 
          
Ln Fund Assets (3) -0.002 0.15 1 
         
Expense Ratio (4) 0.004 -0.07*** -0.62*** 1 
        
Turnover Ratio (5) 0.03 -0.007 -0.08*** 0.14*** 1 
       
Net Flows (6) 0.23*** 0.22*** -0.10*** 0.02 0.02 1 
      
Ln Family Assets (7) 0.02 0.09*** 0.56*** -0.22*** -0.01 -0.05** 1 
     
Tenure (8) -0.09*** 0.03 0.24*** -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 0.08*** 1 
    
Experience (9) -0.09*** -0.06** -0.04* -0.01 -0.04* -0.03 -0.07** -0.003 1 
   
SAT (10) -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04** 0.06*** 0.09*** -0.05** 0.05** 1 
  
GMAT (11) -0.02 -0.02 0.08** -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.12*** -0.006 0.09*** 0.33*** 1 
 
MBA (12)  -0.02  0.01  0.06**  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.007  -0.04* -0.06**  1 
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Table II 
 Sample Distribution by Category and Year 
 
This table reports the sample distribution by Morningstar Category (Panel A) and Event Year (Panel B). The 
Morningstar Category is assigned based on the underlying securities in each fund over the previous three years. The 
Event Year is the year that the sample fund experiences managerial replacement. The sample consists of 1,808 
observations over the period of 1996-2010.  
Panel A 
Morningstar Cat. Total Funds External Percentage Internal Percentage 
Large-Cap Blend 378 108 28.6% 270 71.4% 
Large-Cap Growth 311 87 28.0% 224 72.0% 
Large-Cap Value 298 96 32.2% 202 67.8% 
Mid-Cap Blend 95 26 27.4% 69 72.6% 
Mid-Cap Growth 241 78 32.4% 163 67.6% 
Mid-Cap Value 81 27 33.3% 54 66.7% 
Small-Cap Blend 110 45 40.9% 65 59.1% 
Small-Cap Growth 190 63 33.2% 127 66.8% 
Small-Cap Value 81 34 42.0% 47 58.0% 
Sector 23 13 56.5% 10 43.5% 
Total 1,808 577 31.9% 1,231 68.1% 
 
Panel B 
Year Total Funds External Percentage Internal Percentage 
1996 91 30 33.0% 61 67.0% 
1997 90 31 34.4% 59 65.6% 
1998 92 32 34.8% 60 65.2% 
1999 126 47 37.3% 79 62.7% 
2000 133 39 29.3% 94 70.7% 
2001 105 39 37.1% 66 62.9% 
2002 109 36 33.0% 73 67.0% 
2003 127 45 35.4% 82 64.6% 
2004 119 46 38.7% 73 61.3% 
2005 141 51 36.2% 90 63.8% 
2006 138 53 38.4% 85 61.6% 
2007 158 42 26.6% 116 73.4% 
2008 158 41 25.9% 117 74.1% 
2009 108 18 16.7% 90 83.3% 
2010 113 27 23.9% 86 76.1% 
Total 1,808 577 31.9% 1,231 68.1% 
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Table III 
Cities Ranked by Number of Fund Families (1996-2010) 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the distribution across cities of those fund families in my sample from 1996 
to 2010.  I rank cities by the number of fund families that are located in each for all the U.S.-based stock funds (i.e. 
my initial sample) and the statistics (both #Obs. and %) for this sample are reported in column (1) and (2). I report 
the same statistics in column (3) and (4) for the sample of funds that experience manager turnovers (i.e. my final 
sample). There are 1,265 mutual fund families in my intial sample and 488 mutual fund families in my final sample. 
Only the top-10 cities are reported, and the rest of the mutual fund families are lumped together in “Rest of Cities”. 
 
  All Sample Replacement Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
City # Obs. Percentage # Obs. Percentage 
New York 189 14.9% 73 15.0% 
Boston 152 12.0% 57 11.7% 
Chicago 72 5.7% 22 4.5% 
Philadelphia 63 5.0% 34 7.0% 
San Francisco 51 4.0% 13 2.7% 
Los Angeles 40 3.2% 15 3.1% 
Milwaukee 36 2.8% 10 2.0% 
Baltimore 35 2.8% 11 2.3% 
Houston 34 2.8% 12 2.5% 
Rest of Cities 593 46.9% 240 49.2% 
Total 1,265 100.0% 488 100.0% 
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Table IV 
Univariate Comparisions: Internal versus External Hire 
 
This table compares the characteristics of the sample funds that hire an internal successor (i.e. hire within the fund 
family) with the ones that hire an external successor (i.e. hire outside the fund family). The differences between the 
characteristics of the internal and external hire samples are reported in the last column. The variables are defined in 
Table I. The standard errors from the t-tests are clustered by fund. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%  is 
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively. 
 
Variables Internal External Difference 
#Obs. 1,231 577 
 Pre-turnover Characteristics   
Four-factor Alpha t-1 (%) 1.24 -4.34 5.58*** 
Category-adj. Return t-1 (%) 0.20 -1.82 2.02*** 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  18.52 17.91 0.61*** 
Expense Ratio t-1 (%) 1.31 1.39 -0.08*** 
Turnover Ratio t-1 (%) 108.24 120.89 -12.65** 
Net Flows t-1 (%) 8.63 7.76 0.87 
Ln Family Assets t-1  21.92 21.34 0.58*** 
Predecessor Tenure t-1 4.69 4.06 0.63*** 
Post-turnover Characteristics    
Four-factor Alpha t+1 (%) -1.65 -2.24 0.59** 
Category-adj. Return t+1 (%) -0.15 0.11 -0.26 
Ln Fund Assets t+1 19.94 19.41 0.53*** 
Expense Ratio t+1 (%) 1.32 1.43 -0.11*** 
Turnover Ratio t+1 (%) 113.25 127.89 -14.64*** 
Net Flows t+1 (%) 0.86 0.39 0.47 
Ln Family Assets t+1 22.54 22.01 0.53*** 
Successor Tenure t+1 4.71 4.98 -0.27* 
Successor Experience t 11.68 15.78 -4.1*** 
SAT/100 18.68 19.09 -0.41*** 
GMAT/100 6.60 6.80 -0.2*** 
MBA 0.74 0.83 -0.09*** 
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Table V 
Determinants of Successor Origin 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the probit regressions modeling the choice bwtween hiring the 
successors within (internal hire) versus outside (external hire) the fund family. The model is specified as in equation 
(3). The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if 
she is an internal successor. In column (1), I measure the performance by four-factor alpha. In column (2), I divide 
the sample into three groups based on the fund’s previous three year’s performance. The top performance group 
includes the funds whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes the funds 
whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance quartiles are combined into one group. 
Top, Bottom, and Middle Quartile are indicator variables that equal one if the fund performance belongs to the top, 
bottom, or middle performance group, respectively, and zero otherwise. Note that the indicator variable Middle 
Quartile is not included in the regression because the middle group serves as the base case for the top and bottom 
groups. All the other independent variables are defined in Table I and measured one month prior to the turnover 
event. All specifications include category dummies and year dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund 
level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%  is indicated by ***,**, and * respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: External Hire 
Variables  (1)  (2) 
 
  Four-factor Alpha t-1 -0.033*** 
 
 (-5.801) 
 Top t-1 
 
-0.139* 
  
(-1.864) 
Bottom t-1 
 
0.761*** 
  
(9.434) 
Predecessor Tenure t-1 -0.032*** -0.027*** 
 
(-3.138) (-2.587) 
Ln Family Assets t-1 -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 
(-3.488) (-3.516) 
Financial Center t-1 0.687*** 0.663*** 
 
(9.606) (9.170) 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  -0.019 -0.009 
 
(-0.991) (-0.467) 
Expense Ratio t-1 0.138* 0.069 
 
(1.695) (0.845) 
Turnover Ratio t-1 0.001* 0.001 
 
(1.800) (0.467) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -0.001 0.020 
 
(-0.006) (0.139) 
Category Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
#Obs. 1,808 1,808 
Pseudo R
2
 13.2% 14.2% 
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Table VI 
 Successor Origin and Change in Performance 
 
This table presents the results from the second stage Treatment Effect regressions modeling the impact of successor 
career origin on the change in fund performance. The model is specified as in equation (4). The dependent variable 
is the change of fund performance from pre-replacement period (i.e., month t-36 to t-1) to post-replacement period 
(i.e., month t+1 to t+36). Based on the fund’s previous three-year performance, I divide the sample into three groups. 
The top performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom 
performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance 
quartiles are combined into one group.  The estimated coefficients for the Top, Mid and Bottom groups are reported 
in column (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The last column (4) reports the estimated coefficient for the overall sample. 
External is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if she is an internal 
successor. Other independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications include category dummies and year 
dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is 
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: Δ Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Top Mid Bottom All 
        
 
External -2.618** 1.142*** 4.118*** 1.678*** 
 
(-2.547) (2.800) (4.159) (3.799) 
Experience 0.008 -0.037* -0.062 -0.021 
 
(0.132) (-1.809) (-1.003) (-0.731) 
SAT/100 0.090 0.116* 0.284 0.122* 
 
(0.647) (1.961) (1.633) (1.785) 
MBA -1.101 0.897** 1.155 0.516 
 
(-1.218) (2.322) (1.381) (1.375) 
Ln Family Assets t-1 1.559*** 0.017 1.413*** 1.446*** 
 
(7.847) (0.140) (5.761) (15.887) 
Financial Center t-1 -18.418*** -1.034 -18.271*** -18.162*** 
 
(-13.132) (-1.053) (-8.897) (-22.062) 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  0.654** 0.038 1.298*** 0.806*** 
 
(1.993) (0.371) (5.166) (6.074) 
Expense Ratio t-1 -4.578*** -1.279** -6.063*** -5.422*** 
 
(-4.417) (-2.534) (-5.828) (-11.045) 
Turnover Ratio t-1 -0.034*** 0.006 -0.025*** -0.023*** 
 
(-6.541) (1.519) (-4.837) (-8.891) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -0.009 -1.936*** 2.264 -0.603 
 
(-0.007) (-3.054) (0.964) (-0.738) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -33.747*** -2.111 -41.316*** -36.057*** 
 
(-13.402) (-1.160) (-11.472) (-23.112) 
Category Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 452 904 452 1,808 
Adj. R
2
 76% 12% 50% 68% 
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Table VII 
Successor Origin and Trading Activity 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Probit and OLS regressions modeling the impact of successor 
career origin on the level of fund’s trading activity. The dependent variable Style Drift in column (1) and (2) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a fund changes its investment objective from pre-turnover period to post-turnover 
period and zero otherwise. The dependent variable Port. Turnover column (3) and (4)  is the annual turnover ratio in 
the post-replacement period (i.e. month t+1 to t+12). It is defined as the percentage of fund holdings that have been 
replaced with other holdings in a given year. The independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications 
include category dummies and year dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical 
significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***,**, and * respectively. 
 Style Drift  Port. Turnover 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables Probit Treatment  OLS Treatment 
  
 
       
External 0.456*** 0.459***  1.962*** 1.964*** 
 
(5.169) (5.147)  (8.942) (8.930) 
Experience 0.008 0.008  0.002 0.002 
 
(1.372) (1.349)  (0.172) (0.192) 
SAT/100 0.027 0.029*  0.064** 0.064** 
 
(1.640) (1.728)  (2.279) (2.248) 
MBA 0.079 0.076  -0.129 -0.127 
 
(0.860) (0.824)  (-0.782) (-0.772) 
Four-factor Alpha t-1 -0.009** -0.035***  0.004 0.018 
 
(-2.003) (-3.392)  (0.815) (1.039) 
Ln Family Assets t-1 0.020 -0.022  -0.054* -0.032 
 
(0.948) (-0.849)  (-1.702) (-0.758) 
Financial Center t-1 0.067 0.625***  -0.055 -0.345 
 
(0.782) (2.755)  (-0.397) (-0.893) 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  0.025 -0.001  -0.201*** -0.187*** 
 
(1.180) (-0.028)  (-5.765) (-5.046) 
Expense Ratio t-1 0.148 0.273**  -0.741*** -0.803*** 
 
(1.526) (2.551)  (-3.973) (-3.854) 
Turnover Ratio t-1 0.000 0.001  1.000*** 0.999*** 
 
(0.341) (1.526)  (897.262) (837.788) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -0.484*** -0.468***  0.102 0.092 
 
(-3.617) (-3.470)  (0.433) (0.388) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
1.127***  
 
-0.575 
  
(2.694)  
 
(-0.869) 
Category Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,808 1,808  1,808 1,808 
Pseudo R
2
/Adj. R
2
 14.1% 14.6%  99.9% 99.9% 
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Table VIII 
 Successor Origin and Cross-sectional Performance 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Treatment Effect Model that conduct cross-sectional 
comparison of post-replacement fund performance between internal successors and external successors. The model 
is specified as in equation (5). The dependent variable is fund’s annualized four-factor alpha estimated over the 
subsequent three-year window (i.e. month t+1 to month t+3). External is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
manager is an external successor and zero if she is an internal successor. Deviation is measured by the absolute 
difference between the actual decision of manager origin (0 or 1) and the predicted probability generated from probit 
regression (4). Deviation Dummy equals to one if deviation is greater than 50% and zero othewise. Other 
independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications include category dummies and year dummies. The 
standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***,**, 
and * respectively. 
 Dependent Variable:  Performance 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
External -0.126 
  
 
(-0.434) 
  Deviation 
 
-1.336** 
 
  
(-2.017) 
 Deviation Dummy 
  
-0.699** 
   
(-2.439) 
Experience -0.028 -0.024 -0.023 
 
(-1.505) (-1.332) (-1.288) 
SAT/100 0.112** 0.112** 0.113** 
 
(2.441) (2.433) (2.452) 
MBA 0.316 0.324 0.329 
 
(1.145) (1.189) (1.209) 
Four-factor Alpha t-1 0.019 0.033 0.025 
 
(0.486) (0.858) (0.656) 
Ln Family Assets t-1 -0.035 -0.016 -0.029 
 
(-0.374) (-0.176) (-0.313) 
Financial Center t-1 0.393 0.210 0.348 
 
(0.501) (0.270) (0.441) 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  0.005 0.016 0.010 
 
(0.069) (0.213) (0.133) 
Expense Ratio t-1 -1.236*** -1.246*** -1.211*** 
 
(-3.195) (-3.214) (-3.111) 
Turnover Ratio t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-0.731) (-0.932) (-0.876) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -0.501 -0.474 -0.485 
 
(-0.960) (-0.916) (-0.939) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.855 0.182 0.609 
 
(0.581) (0.125) (0.415) 
Category Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,808 1,808 1,808 
Adj. R
2
 7.1% 7.4% 7.5% 
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Table IX 
Successor Origin and Net Flows 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Treatment Effect Model that conduct cross-sectional 
comparison of post-replacement fund net flows between internal successors and external successors. The dependent 
variable is fund’s annualized net flows estimated over the subsequent one-year window (i.e. month t+1 to month 
t+12). The independent variable are defined as in Table IX. All specifications include category dummies and year 
dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is 
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively. 
 Dependent Variable:  Net Flows 
Variables (1)   (2)  (3) 
    
External -1.095 
  
 
(-1.083) 
  Deviation 
 
-5.146** 
 
  
(-2.256) 
 Deviation Dummy 
  
-2.381** 
   
(-2.414) 
Experience -0.063 -0.063 -0.057 
 
(-0.993) (-0.993) (-0.923) 
SAT/100 0.223 0.223 0.218 
 
(1.187) (1.187) (1.165) 
MBA 0.950 0.950 0.928 
 
(0.880) (0.880) (0.867) 
Four-factor Alpha t-1 0.233** 0.233** 0.295** 
 
(1.975) (1.975) (2.485) 
Four-factor Alpha
2
 t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.800) (-0.800) (-1.118) 
Ln Family Assets t-1 1.450*** 1.450*** 1.514*** 
 
(4.186) (4.186) (4.359) 
Net Flows t-1 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.225*** 
 
(9.715) (9.715) (9.658) 
Financial Center t-1 -4.102* -4.102* -4.757* 
 
(-1.646) (-1.646) (-1.899) 
Ln Fund Assets t-1  -2.370*** -2.370*** -2.335*** 
 
(-9.165) (-9.165) (-9.027) 
Expense Ratio t-1 -5.009*** -5.009*** -5.052*** 
 
(-4.301) (-4.301) (-4.348) 
Turnover Ratio t-1 -0.010* -0.010* -0.012* 
 
(-1.700) (-1.700) (-1.954) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -1.191 -1.191 -1.069 
 
(-0.557) (-0.557) (-0.502) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -8.586* -8.586* -10.876** 
 
(-1.784) (-1.784) (-2.214) 
Category Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,808 1,808 1,808 
Adj. R
2
 24.8% 25.0% 25.0% 
 
